





University of Heidelberg, Germany
Abstract
This article takes issue with those accounts of the right to freedom of expression that
find a zero-sum game between power and freedom. It argues that by marking expression
as a legal problematic, the right to freedom of expression regulates the force of an
expression, and by doing so governs the (expressing qua juridical) subjects. When the
question thus turns onto the subject, the subjects are required to be ‘free in specific
ways’ in order to exercise their freedoms in an apt manner. In order to argue out these
points, this article analyzes the case law of the right to freedom of expression from the
theoretical lens of governmentality. The discussion begins by a reading of a set of cases
brought before European Court of Human Rights: Sürek v. Turkey. Later, the dynamics of
power and subjectivity are commented upon, by discussing the ways through which
expressions merit a legally protected status. Finally, the article focuses on the complex
interdependencies the right to freedom of expression form between an expressing
subject and its juridical capacities on one hand, and between expressivity and the
guarantor of this right on the other.
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Introduction
Customarily, one is told that the right to freedom of expression is connected solely to the
domain of expression. When there is a legal decision against an exercise of this right, it is
only because that the subject has misused its right. Thus, between power and free speech,
there is always a zero-sum game. In this article, the issue of freedom of expression is
approached from another perspective. The perspective offered here takes language as
one that partakes in the constitution of the subjects. The legal decision for or against the
exercise of the right of freedom of expression, therefore, turns onto the question of the
subject. I argue that by marking expressivity as a legal problematic, the right to freedom
of expression both regulates the force of an expression and governs the subjects. It means
that when the question turns onto the subject, that subject is then required to be ‘free in
specific ways’ (Rose, 1989; Rose et al., 2006: 89) in order to exercise its freedoms in an
apt manner.
In order to argue out these points, I analyze the case law of the right to freedom of
expression. The analysis of the case law contends that the right to freedom of expression
relies on certain power formulations in order to be constituted – and then to function – as
such. Further, the right to freedom of expression is analyzed as being one that appropri-
ates connected discourses (e.g. those that differentiate the artistic expression from the
political) and institutional techniques (e.g. by requiring that the advertisement policies
or patent laws be in line with the legal interpretation of this right) onto its domain. This
analysis is then brought to bear onto the main thesis of this article: as expressivity
becomes an object of government, the right to freedom of expression participates in the
regulation of it in order to both optimize and regulate freedom.
In order to support this contention, I rely on the theoretical lens of ‘governmentality’.
Foucault used this concept to accentuate the importance of a government of subjects
oriented to a calculated administration of lives, in contrast to the traditional problem
of political sovereignty that stood, as it were, in a relation of ‘transcendence’ to its ter-
ritory and inhabitants (Foucault, 2007: 136–142). With its focus on ‘the broad sense of
techniques and procedures for directing human behavior’ (Foucault, 1997: 82), a govern-
mentality perspective is useful in analyzing the issue of free speech, because it empha-
sizes the specific ways of investing into freedom of the subjects within a social body that
enables an apt of exercise of freedom on behalf of those subjects to take place. This per-
spective then distances itself from those theoretical approaches that by opposing power
and freedom, expression and being, and sovereign and autonomy are unable to account
for a governmental exercise of power. With this perspective, then, it is seen how the right
to freedom of expression delineates the broad contours of legally protectable as far as
expression is concerned, and how by doing so it orients the domain of government to the
problem of expression. This dynamic reflexively targets expressivity as a target of power
by requiring that it be governed through an ensemble of ‘institutions, procedures, anal-
yses and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ (Foucault, 1997: 107). If it can be argued
out so, then this point is ontologically important. It means not only that power governs
expressivity and governs through expressivity, but also that power affects the subjects
because of the decisive role of language in their constitution. In sum, with this perspec-
tive, I flesh out the manner in which freedom and power intersect in the discourse of
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rights to produce and manage subjects through freedom (Agamben, 2009: 11; Brown,
1995: 118; Esposito, 2008: 37–38; Foucault, 1983: 221; Patton, 1998: 64–77).
By looking at the right to freedom of expression as being a ‘government of expressiv-
ity’, this article attempts to fill an important lacuna in the governmentality studies liter-
ature (e.g. Ewald, 1990; Golder, 2013; Hunt and Wickham, 1994). If the focus of this
literature has been on the tactics of government that manage ‘free subjects, and only
insofar as they are free’ (Foucault, 1983: 221), then an absence of works studying the
governmental techniques with which the issue of free speech is enmeshed seems all the
more surprising. This point is academically and politically relevant because in legal and
political theory the guarantee of the right to freedom of expression is presented as a guar-
antee of political freedom tout court (Dworkin, 2009: v–ix; Norris, 2008: 186; Waldron,
2012: 173). However, given the expanse of free speech, I only focus on the jurisprudence
of the right to freedom of expression in the European human rights law. Apart from con-
venience, concentrating on European human rights law is useful because a number of
commentators have noted its comparative political and legal effectiveness (e.g. Ther-
born, 2001: 83). Therefore, this empirical focus can help one ascertain the regularities
that human rights require in order to operate, and which they (re)produce in order to
function within a historical continuum (cf. Foucault, 1972: 229). Further, this focus
steers away our attention from the violation of human rights in the ‘global peripheries’
with their ‘outbursts of ethnic conflicts and slaughters, religious fundamentalisms, or
racial and xenophobic movements’ (Rancière, 2004: 297) in order to see the way human
rights function at ‘the center’.
The argument in this article proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces the dis-
cussion by reading a set of cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR): Sürek v. Turkey. The theoretical discussion of this case law works as a prism
through which the broader issues of free speech and governmentality are explored in the
next two sections. The second part comments on the dynamics of power and subjectivity
in free speech. This is done by analyzing the techniques through which a legally pro-
tected status is granted to an expression. The third part then focuses on the role of the
sovereign guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. Predictably, the discussion
in this article draws largely on the case law that has been selected for our reading.1 With
this major limitation, the aim of the article nevertheless is to draw a rough outline of a
‘specific historical paradigm’ (to draw on a phrase from Agamben) (Agamben and
Ulrich, 2004: 609–610) of the right to freedom of expression by looking at it ‘when it
is doing its work’ (Wittgenstein, 2009: cxxxv).
On the Dynamics of Subjectivities: Reading Sürek v. Turkey
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
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are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integ-
rity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary. (European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 10: Right to Free-
dom of Expression)
In order to look at the way free speech functions, I begin by reading a specific case law:
Sürek v. Turkey. What is of interest in this set of cases is that it deals with a single appli-
cant. In two cases, his request was granted (No. 1 and No. 3), while in the other two it was
not (No. 2 and No. 4). What is crucial to note here is the way expression merges with the
subject who expresses, and the way the addressee relates with the world that those
expressions produce. This set of cases involved a major shareholder in a Turkish limited
liability company that owned an Istanbul-based weekly review Haberde Yorumda Ger-
çek (‘The Truth of News and Comments’). All the four applications submitted by the
applicant dealt with the actions of Turkish government against the review’s handling
of the Kurdish situation in southeast Turkey. ECtHR issued its judgment on July 8,
1999. In this section, I analyze three of the applications: No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4.
Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1)
On August 30, 1992, the review’s issue no. 23 published two letters by its readers: Silah-
lar Özgürlüğü Engelleyemez (‘Weapons cannot win against freedom’) and Suç Bizim (‘It
is our fault’). The first letter commented on the ‘war of national liberation of Kurdistan’
against the ‘fascist Turkish army’ ready to commit a ‘massacre’ (para. 11). The second
letter advocated the idea that ‘if they won’t give, then we’ll take by force’ (para. 11). In
its judgment dated April 12, 1994, the Istanbul National Security Court ( _Istanbul Devlet
Güvenlik Mahkemesi) sentenced the applicant to a fine as per the Prevention of Terror-
ism Act 1991 for the ‘propaganda aimed at the destruction of the territorial integrity of
the Turkish State’ and for publishing racist speech (paras 15 and 18). The applicant
appealed to ECtHR alleging violation of ECHR Article 6 on fair trial and ECHR Article
10 on freedom of expression. On February 20, 1995, the then-in-place European Com-
mission of Human Rights (ECmHR) declared the application admissible.
Before ECtHR, the applicant claimed that the antiterror law rather than safeguarding
his right to freedom of expression was itself an interference with it. This is because the
said law did two things. First, it exempted itself from a critical use of free speech in the
name of emergency. Second, it drew out a vague linguistic domain into which an expres-
sion cannot enter lest it through that very performative ‘threaten the indivisible unity of
the nation’ (paras 45–47). Given the reach of an international court (ECtHR) and the spe-
cific procedure adopted by the legislating nation-state (Turkey), the measure was never-
theless deemed as being ‘prescribed by law’ by the Court. The question then turned onto
the way expression operated in the light of such legalities. It was argued that the pub-
lished letters could not be seen as ‘an encouragement to violence’ (para. 49). However,
it was argued by the government that the words used in the letters were themselves
‘threatening’ (para. 50). This included, for instance, the label ‘national liberation
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struggle’ instead of ‘terrorist activities’, which by implication praised crime and jeopar-
dized security, and the proper noun ‘Kurdistan’ instead of the geographical label ‘south-
eastern Turkey’ that endangered the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. When the
violence of the words thus merged with the violent situation outside, violence was only
fuelled further. Consequently, there was a ‘legitimate aim’ in screening the words that
may deteriorate the situation further (para. 52). Was this interference necessary in a dem-
ocratic society, as ECHR Article 10(2) requires? In order to identify this, the expression
is to be read both backward into the mouth of addressee ‘with particular regards to the
words used’ (para. 62) and then forward onto its effects on the social body ‘with regards
to the context in which they were published’ (para. 62).2 This then measures the subject
of the right to freedom of expression vis-à-vis its expressions. Through this, the world
that an expression conjures up is analyzed. This allows expressivity to surface as a target.
Since expressivity is an enabling condition that stands in between the subject and its
expressions on one hand and between expressions and the corresponding world on the
other, regulating it sustains a world in which the things are placed in their proper social
positions.
The analysis of expression in this case proceeds in two parts. First, it is seen that the
‘labels such as the fascist Turkish army’’, ‘‘the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti murder gang’’ and
‘‘the hired killers of imperialism’’ alongside references to ‘‘massacres’’, ‘‘brutalities’’
and ‘‘slaughter’’’ stigmatized ‘the other side’ (para. 62). This entailed that the expression
in question ‘stirred up base emotions’ (para. 62). Second, because the events since 1985
in the region had meant the imposition of an emergency rule in much of the southeast, the
expression in question ‘communicated to the reader that recourse to violence is a neces-
sary and justified measure of self-defense in the face of the aggressor’ (para. 62). Further,
by naming the persons, the second letter also made those figures named vulnerable to
‘the possible risk of physical violence’ (para. 62). This point bears out another rationale:
through the aforementioned performative, certain beings (i.e. the military officers) are
conjured up as already vulnerable. It presumes that there are individuals existing within
a society with violent tendencies desirous of directing such energies against those per-
sonalities. Although such segments do not account for ‘the public’ in general, these nev-
ertheless exist within it as a component. It means that when the public is addressed, there
is a need to keep such an aspect of the public in mind. Now, this means that the addressee
who expresses is also to be measured as per the significations and the social effects of its
expressions. It is only when each is brought to bear onto and then filtered through the
instruments of human rights that it can be determined whether what has been expressed
merits the status of free speech. Given that the expression in question could be seen as
‘hate speech’ and as ‘glorifying violence’ (para. 62), there was therefore a ‘pressing
social need’ in penalizing it. Hence, in No. 1, the suppression of the applicant’s speech
did not constitute a violation of its right to freedom of expression.
There is a curious dynamic at work here constituting the subject of the right to free-
dom of expression in its peculiarity. The performative is to relate to the various flows of
subjectivity for the constitution of the subject to take place. Seen from the domestic law,
there is a subject who has to abide by the national law in order to regulate its conduct.
Similarly, as per ECHR Article 6, there is juridical subject whose speech can only be put
to test in a ‘fair trial’. Seen from the angle of the then prevailing sociopolitical crisis,
Nasir 5
 at UB Heidelberg on May 23, 2015sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
there was a citizen of the Turkish Republic who needed to be careful in not reinforcing
the antistate discourse at the moment when the State had placed an emergency regime in
place. Seen from ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1, there was an owner of an Istanbul-based
review media who had the right to the ‘peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’. Alter-
nately, seen from the communications’ media law, there was an owner of a media who
was subjected ‘vicariously to the duties and responsibilities’ (para. 63). This owner had
to ensure that the content that its review publishes remained mindful of the public to
whom it was being addressed, by ‘not overstep[ping] the bounds’ (para. 59). This simul-
taneously entails that there was already the public that precedes the address, even if later
affected by it, which has the right to be imparted information and ideas in the most suit-
able manner (para. 59).3
For the subject to function as a juridical subject holding the human right to freedom of
expression, it has to navigate this tortuous linguistic terrain interlocked between subjec-
tivity and expressivity. Therefore, there is a speech that has to respect, even when it may
question, the law that protects it. There is speech that is to be ruled by law that reads it.
There is a speech that has to appreciate the delicacy of the emergency situation by cir-
culating in an apt manner. There is a speech that takes place through the medium that the
applicant owns as its private property. Because of this owning capacity, this speech may
not be constricted unduly. On the other hand, there is a media platform that provides the
speech with an outlet, and that must therefore ensure that the speech it mediates functions
as per the communication rules and standards of the media. There is a speech that does
not have to name the specific persons performing the specific acts, lest it may make them
vulnerable to the possible acts of violence. There is a speech, which is already being con-
strained by the entities it has to address, even before the address, lest it undoes those very
subjects. In this sense, different speaking voices cohere to constitute a subject in No. 1, as
the one who by providing a platform to an expression overstepped the legal bounds,
fueled violence in an already violent situation, did not fulfill the public’s right to be
informed appropriately, did not use its property as ‘provided for by law and by the gen-
eral provisions of international law’ as ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1 requires, produced
individuals as potential targets of violence by naming them, and one whose simple force
of signature fanned violent divisions.
Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2)
On April 26, 1992, the review contained a news report providing information given at a
press conference by a delegation on its visit to Şırnak village. The news report included
an article detailing that the Şırnak police chief had been given an order to open fire on
people. Further, it narrated a dialogue between the delegation and the Gendarme Com-
mander, where the latter was noted to threaten the former by saying ‘Your blood would
not quench my thirst’ (para. 10). In a judgment dated May 29, 1992, the Istanbul National
Security Court sentenced the applicant to a fine as per section 6 Prevention of Terrorism
Act 1991 for ‘containing an allegation’ and ‘rendering officials mandated to fight terror-
ism target of terrorist attacks’ (paras 11 and 13). The applicant appealed to ECtHR alle-
ging an unjustified interference in his freedom of expression as per ECHR Article 10. On
September 2, 1996, ECmHR declared the application admissible.
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The applicant claimed that section 6 of the 1991 Antiterror Act forbade the disclosure
of the identity of officials fighting terrorism. The effect this censor had was one where
law itself opened up a protective space to those officials who are charged with executing
it to violate law with impunity. Therefore, the applicant’s exercise of freedom of expres-
sion in No. 2 referred back to the rule of law, in a substantive sense, even if it overstepped
the legal bounds as established by the 1991 Act. However, instead of reading the ‘qual-
ity’ of law in case, the Court acknowledged that the interference can be taken as being
prescribed by law (para. 25), even when it could be seen that the legal procedure as per
ECHR Article 6 relating to a fair trial may not have been adhered to (para. 54). Further,
by naming individuals, the applicant had violated the ‘right of the others’ that in their
specific capacity should not have been named or identified (para. 29). Similarly, by
offering a narration on the contested matters, the interference in the applicant’s freedom
of expression can be said to have been taken in the ‘interests of national security and ter-
ritorial integrity which are legitimate aims under ECHR Article 10(2)’ (para. 29).
Was the interference necessary in a democratic society, as ECHR Article 10(2) states?
The applicant stated that the impugned data had formed an ‘objective’ news report from
a press conference (para. 30). This meant that the publication in question only circulated
a speech that had already been made public in accordance with the journalistic ethics and
norms. Therefore, the speech was out there: repeated by other journalistic avenues and
hence already existing as ‘copyable’ (para. 30). Similarly, the published words were not
praiseful of terrorism (para. 30). In order to identify whether the interference was nec-
essary in a democratic society and met a pressing social need, both the world narrated
by the language and the world sustaining the language are analyzed. First, the act of tal-
lying statements from the Governor and Gendarme Commander meant that ‘the officers
were now exposed to strong public contempt’ (para. 37). This also entailed that by their
documented statements, the officers themselves displayed violent tendencies that possi-
bly went beyond the pale of law. Second, by naming them, the use of language remained
insensitive to the ‘situation of conflict and tension’ (para. 36). Therefore, the report only
aggravated the regional situation (para. 37). In this sense, the interference may be nec-
essary in a democratic society.
However, did it meet a pressing social need? First, the report noted information from a
press conference (para. 40). This meant that if the expression in question and the disclo-
sure of information were incriminatory, then charges should have been brought by the
government against everyone who were copying the statements: the press conference
delegates, other journalists reporting it, the media outlets publishing it, and the webpages
circulating it. Since ‘other newspapers were not prosecuted’ (para. 40), the applicant had
only been singled out undemocratically. Consequently, the speech had created a socio-
linguistic milieu in which it was being circulated. This meant that though law can make a
specific expression accountable, the milieu itself (i.e. primarily the disclosure of offi-
cials’ identity) could not be undone. Hence, the ‘potential damage had already been
done’ (para. 40). On the other hand, the imperative requiring that the identity of the offi-
cers should not be disclosed also clashed with the duty of press to open matters of public
concern (para. 41). This again meant that the said expression had to be tailored in a spe-
cific manner with respect to the public, to inform the public of the concerns that deal with
it in order to make those matters discussable, while holding back those aspects that could
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make the public direct its undesirable capacities on unbefitting subjects. The potency of
free speech therefore caters to the potential violations of rights, which may possibly
occur, while bringing such considerations preemptively onto the legal plane. Because
of a certain friction (the rights of the press contra the rights of others, the right of public
to be informed contra its right to be shielded off from exposure to violence, and the
right of disclosure contra the right of secrecy), the interference was deemed dispropor-
tionate. Hence, in No. 2, there was a violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of
expression.
Let us reconstruct the dynamics within which the performative operates to constitute
the subject in No. 2. Seen from the domestic law, there is a subject who seeks to reinforce
law even when transgressing it in order to inform the sovereign of those who overstep
law in the name of law. Alternately, there was citizen of a nation-state who had to respect
the conditions of emergency imposed by the state. On the other hand, there was a legal
subject placed into the national law, whose special antiterror case had to take place in a
special court of law. From the perspective of ECHR Article 6, there is a holder of rights
whose expression can only be analyzed by an independent and fair tribunal. Seen from
the angle of the prevailing situation, there was someone whose reporting created certain
officials as potential targets of terrorism by naming them. Seen from the perspective of
the press, there was a media platform that only relayed information given at a press
conference. Alternately, the subject had to address the public in the manner so that the
information and the ideas are conveyed to strengthen pluralism without leading the
public into the corners of violence. Viewed from Article 10(1), there is a subject having
an expansive freedom of expression. Viewed from Article 10(2), there is a subject
whose expression has to respect the rights of the other subjects (para. 29), among
others.
For the free speech to function – and for its subject to be sustained – it has to navigate
these flows. There is a speech that even when it may question law seeks to uphold the
rule of law. There is a speech that has to be taciturn in view of the ‘formalities, condi-
tions, or restrictions’ as per ECHR Article 10(2). There is a speech that has to take place
in a manner that it can then vindicate itself and its subject before an independent tribunal.
There is a speech that has to inform without an ‘explicit’ disclosure (para. 32). There is a
speech that has to function as per the professional journalistic standards. There is a
speech that repeats in a careful manner the statements already in circulation. Therefore,
the subject in No. 2 was one who by providing a platform to speech that did not praise
terrorism, may have overstepped legal bounds, but only to show that law was also being
trampled upon, and that named the officials, but only against a background of a spread of
such information. Therefore, even if the performative in question interpellated the
reported subjects as both ‘acting unlawfully’ and as the ‘targets for terrorism’, it had the
utility of (in)forming the public and adding a matter of importance into the overall econ-
omy of speech.
Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)
On March 13, 1993, the review’s issue no. 51 published a news commentary ‘Kewa and
Dehak Once Again’.4 This article opined that the legendary battle between Kewa and
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Dehak would be rekindled in the wake of upcoming Noruz (Spring Festival, New Year)
celebrations. This was an allusion to an increase in the tension between the government
and the rebel factions in southeast Turkey. In the same issue, an interview was also pub-
lished of a representative of a banned political wing of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
(PKK), which defined the Republic of Turkey as ‘the real terrorist’ (para. 13). In a judg-
ment dated September 27, 1993, the Istanbul National Security Court sentenced the
applicant to a fine as per sections 6 and 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991, after
having earlier seized the editions of the review on March 14, 1993. These measures were
taken because the expression disseminated a ‘propaganda against the indivisibility of
State’ (para. 12). In its reasoning, the Istanbul court held the applicant accountable for
the incriminatory words used: section of Turkish population as ‘Kurds’ and internal ter-
rorist insurgency as an ‘external war’ (para. 18). The applicant appealed to ECtHR alle-
ging interference with his right to freedom of expression. On September 2, 1995,
ECmHR declared the application admissible.
Neither the lawfulness of interference (paras 42–45) nor its pursuance of legitimate
aims (paras 46–49) was contested. The question therefore turned onto the question
whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society or met a pressing social
need. The applicant claimed that he provided only a platform to a speech but this did not
mean endorsement of its content on his behalf. Similarly, although the news commentary
was based upon prior editorial selection and review, freedom of expression nevertheless
also extended to publishing opinions that may ‘offend, shock or disturb’, as ECtHR’s
case law explicitly states (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, para. 49; Otto-
Preminger Institüt v. Austria, para. 49). Therefore, the applicant argued that the publica-
tion of speech in this case met the ‘objective standards of objective journalism’ (para.
50). However, the government deemed that by circulating threatening words the review
disseminated harmful speech: showing Turkey as divided, PKK heroic and justified,
Turkish Republic as an ‘enemy’ and ‘terrorist state’ (para. 51). Therefore, the force of
glorifying words was enough to aggravate the existing difficult situation, which then
meant that the situation in such a form (as a ‘security threat’) had been conjured up into
being (para. 49). It is this reality that is constrained and regulated, when expressivity is
governed.
In order to identify whether the interference was proportionate, particular focus
was directed, similar to No. 1, at ‘the content of impugned statements’ and ‘the con-
text in which they were made’ (para. 54). First, the use of labels ‘Kurds’, ‘Kurdistan’,
‘terrorist State’, and ‘liberation struggle’ might be seen as questioning territorial
integrity of the state. However, the overall narration into which these words were
inserted ‘romanticized the Kurdish cause’ by ‘drawing on the names of legendary fig-
ures of the past’ (para. 58). Because of its literary overtones, the exaggerations were
rather metaphorical devices, like the use of phrase ‘it is time to settle accounts’ (para.
58). Because of its aesthetic undertones, the effect of expression was merely one of
description of an awakening of collective sentiment. Therefore, once expression is
disclosed as having an aesthetic symbolism, it merits a different consideration. Unlike
the political or the commercial expression, it is not the form of aesthetic expression
that is primarily the question but its effect which may, in this case, come under the
rubric of ‘an appeal to violence’. Precisely because the said expression bordered both
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the political and the aesthetic, its violence was absorbed by the artistic and its fiction
by the political. This also means that what exists in art cannot be subjected to the cri-
terion of corresponding mechanically with what exists in fact, since what exists in art
cannot be disassociated from the way it is made to exist in it. For the purpose of law,
the artistic expression, despite the ‘excess’ of its significations, seldom crosses over
from expression into the threshold of threatening practical action, and can therefore
more readily be included into the protected domain of free speech. Similarly, in the
interview published, there was ‘hard-hitting criticism of Turkish authorities’ (para.
58). However, through the careful use of words and the possibility of opening oneself
to other nonviolent alternatives, the interview was more of a ‘hardened attitude of one
side to the conflict, rather than a call to violence’ (para. 58). Therefore, the tone
swayed between the hardened and the conciliatory. This meant that both the first
speech (identified as artistic) and the second speech (identified as political and par-
tially conciliatory) could neither be construed as emanating from the violent subjects
nor utilizing a platform to promote violence (para. 58). Hence, in No. 4, the speech
could be seen as ‘free speech’ and there was violation of the applicant’s right to free-
dom of expression.
Again, there are various flows of subjectivity that work upon the performative to
determine one as a specific subject. Seen from the domestic law, there is a subject who
portrays antiterror activities in positive tone and publishes interviews of a banned orga-
nization. Then, there is a subject living in a democratic society where it is required to
publish unsavory opinions in order to reflect and sustain pluralism. Seen from Article
10(1), there is a subject who through his its speech can exercise self-fulfillment. Seen
from Article 10(2), there is a subject whose speech has to respect the territorial integrity
and the indivisibility of the state. Similarly, there is an owner of media platform who
only provides a speech with an outlet. However, in providing it with an outlet, the subject
is also seen as responsible for it. Therefore, the speech only becomes free in virtue of
these flows. There is a speech that may portray antiterror activities in a certain tone, but
because of its artistic underpinnings it cannot be seen to incite violence. With the same
logic, there is an aesthetic speech that may produce a certain unsavory effect on those
that it criticizes, but this does not automatically entail that it may incite others to explicit
violence as well. There is a political speech that tends to question the necessities of the
state and the existing democratic society, but whose underlying meanings tend to sublim-
inal because of its artistic undertones. Therefore, the subject in No. 4 was the one who
provided a platform to a speech that romanticized, informed not endorsed, fulfilled
duties of media by informing on divisive opinions, published a narration clothed in a lit-
erary garb, and whose language therefore did not incite others to violence. Similarly,
through its performative, the subject fulfilled its roles (owner of review, press in a dem-
ocratic society, and publishing useful speech) with appropriate effects (pluralism, infor-
mation, and public discussion).
Having analyzed Sürek in some detail, the remaining discussion now expands its
orbit in order to comment on the way expressivity is governed. In order to connect the
question of power to the right of freedom of expression, the next two sections intervene
into the broader case law of ECtHR, while largely remaining indebted to the reading of
Sürek.
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Powers of Expressivity: The Signatory, Signified, and the
Signature
As once, he could have evoked the foreign spirit simply by modifying a few terms; now he is
himself evoked by a simple change in the play of words. (Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite
Conversation)
In the case law of the right to freedom of expression, what is important to note is the way
an expression is made to speak and the way it turns back onto its subject.5 As expressions
speak, the addressee is then governed in the light of expressions’ significations. As a
result, the evaluation addressing the issue of legal protection of an expression places both
the signatory and its corresponding world onto ‘the scales of words’ (to borrow a phrase
from Gadamer) (Gadamer, 2003: 398). The signatory is then placed into the flows of sub-
jectivity in order to determine the place it and its signature occupies in the overall econ-
omy of speech, as can be noted in Sürek, for instance. It is therefore not that a juridical
subject misuses its set of rights; the subject in its peculiarity is itself the process.6 It is this
process that equates the signatory and the juridical subject, where it is because of its jur-
idical status that the corresponding expressions can be problematized. Then, the legal
decision concerning freedom of expression does not simply tell that this specific expres-
sion cannot be protected, but more fundamentally that this specific subject position is
untenable. This means that the subject whose human right to freedom of expression is
to be guaranteed by a sovereign under the rule of law is a juridical subject whose expres-
sivity turns up as a matter of legal interest. Not only does the power of language as exer-
cised by the speaking humanizing subject, but also the power over the humanized subject
as exercised by language, generate techniques of governing the human subject in the dis-
course of human rights.
The task of determining which of the specific expressions can be legally protected
draws out a limit within which alone can expressions be legally protected. It leads the
sovereign guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression into a connected power terrain
as expressive juridical protocols get oriented to the question as to what can be expressed
and which specific subjects are to be listened. Then, the legal decision to regard certain
utterances as inadmissible and protect certain others entails a decision as to which cate-
gory of subjects can be legally sustained. From the other side, this dynamic reflexively
draws out certain limits that are utilized by the subjects themselves in order that they may
speak and be listened to. This connection betrays an interest in the performative wherein
speech and subject interpenetrate (Althusser, 1971: 170–175; Butler, 1997: 11). For
example, the legal prohibitions on denial of the Holocaust or its various aspects thereof
(e.g. D.I. v. Germany, Garaudy v. France), or ban on symbolism and rhetoric associated
with National Socialism (e.g. Kühnen v. Germany, Schimanek v. Austria), work not only
in limiting the proliferation of certain expressions, but more fundamentally in forestall-
ing the (re)production of certain subjects.
Two dynamics, working in tandem, are operative here. First, a subject is formed out of
singular instances as unitary and unified, who thenceforth ‘exists’. Through language,
what takes place is one’s own ‘gathering (versammeln) into the appropriation’
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(Heidegger, 1976: 190). It entails that the subject is free both as a gatherable ‘effect’ and
precedes itself as a specific appropriable ‘free body’. Free speech in this sense certainly
optimizes the domain of expression. But, it is something more as well: it opens up a field
where the subjects may recreate themselves intra-subjectively. It is here that the second
dynamic comes to fore. Since the multiplication of difference requires that the practices
be allotted their appropriate social place, there is always a need to regulate this multipli-
cation so that freedom can be aptly (re)produced. The jurisprudence of free speech there-
fore marks expressivity both as a domain of freedom that ought to be protected and as a
problem that needs to be regulated. Resultantly, expression is an exercise of freedom on
one hand, and an act that needs to vindicate its freedom before law when summoned on
the other. When summoned, expressions express in what manner the signatory bears
freedom. This may range from an expression being an exercise in ‘self-fulfillment’
(Giniewski, para. 43) to the signatory fulfilling the given ‘duties and responsibilities’
(as among all the convention articles Article 10(2) uniquely makes reference to).7 In this
sense, the effectiveness of the discourse of human rights does not lie in simply ensuring
that its norms be executed legally, but in enabling the conditions that sustain it to be
(re)produced in the social body.
Further, it must be appreciated that language is fundamentally oriented toward the
others that it addresses. This is to the extent that language gives the addressed a ‘certain
social existence’ (Butler, 1997: 2, 5; Heidegger, 1976: 192). In this sense, what is signif-
ied by an expression logically brings the addressed into consideration. At time, when the
other is not present, as it is in the written forms of expression, then it has to be brought
more forcefully into being as an already formed entity. Then, at such moments, expres-
sion has to be cognizant of the public that is already there with its being (say, collective-
ness, uniformity, shared goods, obligations, and concerns) and interests (say,
maintenance of democracy, rigorous debates, and social needs) or ‘the readers’ who are
there with their inclinations (say, violent and literary). Similarly, the content of the visual
media, because it relies on a medium that has an immediate and powerful effect, is more
stringently measured as per its sensitivity to its ‘viewers’ and ‘audiences’ having their
peculiar sensibilities (cf. Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, para. 79; Murphy v. Ire-
land, para. 74). It means that the forceful intervention that expressions make into the
being of the addressed is to be delimited by the markers of the permissible. By determin-
ing in what manner does an expression produce effects on the social body (healthy debate
and effective incitement), with what intensity and through which medium (Internet blog
and public rally), and what specific expressions can then be legally allowed for (fully
tolerated and merely tolerable), there takes place an approximation to the ‘total [speech]
situation’ (Austin, 1962: 52). The overall impact may range from an expression being
‘capable of furthering progress in human affairs’ (Giniewski v. France, para. 43) to ser-
ving the ‘general interests’ (Markt Intern v. Germany, paras 32–36).8 This rationale
inscribes the legal protection of expressions as free speech onto the notions of necessity,
whose changing dynamics consequently affect what is to be understood as free speech
(cf. De Becker v. Belgium, The Facts, section 11).
Further, while reading Sürek, we noted that the signature both draws on and inter-
venes into the field of social difference, where the content of the rights that the signatory
bears is always specific. In this sense, one cannot approach the right to freedom of
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expression with either the grid of equality or that of inequality, since the right to freedom
of expression does not require that the signatories be uniform. Built into the very fabric
of free speech, there is logically hosted a regimentation of speech with its varying social
significations. What is however important is that human rights not only oversee the
expressions with regard to the legal rules on patents, media privileges, licensing, copy-
rights, advertisements, content display, and commercial secrecy, among others, but also
pull those very laws and policies within its purview. The obverse of this is that such leg-
alities are not solely enacted with due regard to the workings of the right to freedom of
expression, rather it is through such installments that difference is governed to produce
free speech.9 It may be sound to object that free speech hands over everyone a formally
equal right to free speech (isegoria), but, given the variance of speaking positions, the
substantive impact of speaking freely (parrhêsia) remains unequal (cf. Brown 1995:
114; Marx, 1994: 9). However, the efficacy of the right to freedom of expression lies
in its ability to regulate the produced asymmetry between the interlocutors. Now, for
sure, an owner of a media outlet possesses better opportunities to exercise the right to
freedom of expression than the ‘ordinary’ people that that media interviews. However,
the right to freedom of expression subjects the former ‘vicariously to the duties and
responsibilities which the editorial and journalistic staff undertake in the collection and
dissemination of information to the public’ (Sürek No. 1, para. 63). Despite the graded
categorizations, it does not entail that occupying a certain subject position makes every-
thing freely sayable and legally protectable for that specific subject, and it is this capacity
of governing asymmetry that optimizes freedom.
In this sense, as expressivity is targeted as an object of government, law does not have
to problematize every expression. Instead, as can be seen in Sürek, once policies regard-
ing media and the rules on content have been defined, and appropriate legal procedures
have been fulfilled, among others, expression is to operate on its own within these con-
strictions. What is done here in the government of expressivity is that the very possibility
of language use becomes analyzable, where at time both the addressee and the addressed
exist as certain subjects, such as those in policy formulations, bureaucratic documenta-
tions, official statistical accounts, and quantitative representations, among others, at
times without their presence and without their speech acts taking place. The role of law
is to identify the parameters through which this overall expressive economy can be gov-
erned ‘at a distance [and] in the proper way’ (Foucault, 1977: 11; Foucault, 2007: 46;
Rose and Miller, 1992: 173, 181).10 There is neither the substitution nor the redundancy
of law here, but interdependencies that tie it to the broader discursive practices. Law nev-
ertheless occupies a strategic role in order to ensure that the systemic functioning
remains at optimum (Foucault, 1978: 144; Rose and Valverde, 1998). It is for this reason
as well that even human rights become concrete when there is a political guarantor leg-
ally ensuring the universal rules associated with it by backing it with a coercive but nev-
ertheless lawful force (Arendt, 1973: 90–103). Now, when problem cases arise, the
sovereign is to then interfere explicitly with its legal arm so that an optimum is sustained.
Thus, free speech requires peculiar investments of power and legality in order to be con-
stituted as such.11
Further, the reliance of free speech on specific modalities of power produces two gen-
eral problem categories. When it comes to the jurisprudence of freedom of expression,
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the politically relevant question is what kind of expressions may not deserve legal pro-
tection and what kind of expressions may not require it. First, there can be expressions
that may certainly be free, but still remain outside the sphere of law. The mismatch
between freedom and legality means that such expressions cannot qualify as a protected
free speech. One can take here a video message from an effective secessionist group as
an example. In this sense, freedom that may never be disclosed as a target and an object
of government does not merit the definition of freedom. In the second case, there can be
expressions that are disciplined and controlled, but still remain beyond the scope of law
when it comes to the optimization of their circulation, such as the scientific ones for
example. In the case of science, what is important to note is that it can be the use of sci-
ence (functionality) that can become a part of a debate as per the right of freedom of
expression, but seldom the truth (its scientificity) of the world opened up by the scientific
discourse (cf. Foucault, 1991: 58). The fact that there can be truth claims, such as the
scientific, that because of their veritable status do not require juridical protocols of pro-
tection points to a more complicated relation between truthfulness and free speech.
When it comes to the interrelation of free speech and truthfulness, two limit categories
can be discerned. First, in general cases, the jurisprudence of free speech does not require
truthfulness as an essential precondition in order to protect an expression as free speech,
since requiring such a fulfilment in the case of ‘value judgments’ infringes ‘freedom of
opinion itself’, as ECtHR noted in Dichand v. Austria (para. 42; cf. Dalban v. Romania,
para. 49). On the other hand, in certain cases, even when an expression ‘is true and
describes real events’ it cannot be granted the status of free speech in order to respect,
for instance, ‘privacy’ or ‘commercial confidentiality’, as ECtHR noted in Markt Intern
(para. 35). The government of expressivity can then be seen to incite expression when it
is useful but untrue in one case, and to limit it when it is true but infelicitous in the other.
Of all, then, it is crucial to note that before expressions become the object of analyses,
the specific vocabularies in which the signature occurs have to be disclosed as analyzable
in the first place, along with their varying gradations. The analyses of words, content,
medium, genre, and methods later operate as important building blocks in constructing
the edifice of free speech. Such a possibility afforded through language makes possible
the establishment of relationships and cross comparisons in the legal deliberations. It is
of use therefore to see what kind of vocabulary, with which an expression is signed, mer-
its what kind of status in the jurisprudence of freedom of expression. This point is impor-
tant since in human rights the legal protection that the artistic has is different from the
political, and in the same vein, the political merits different consideration than the com-
mercial.12 Therefore, the expanse and the privilege of free speech are then determined by
the rationale according to which an expression in question is merited the status of the
political, the aesthetic, the commercial, and the theological, among others. It means that
one becomes a different juridical subject of rights bearing different duties, if the signa-
tory is seen as a politician, artist, property owner, religious, and so on.13 This dynamic
enables law to apply differing margins of appreciation to the various types of expressions
depending ‘on the context and on the mix of interests at stake’ (Mahoney, 1997: 379). It
also entails that there can be limit cases, where the political may turn seditious or the
aesthetic obscene. At such times, the role of law is to rule the expression by determining
in what manner and through which rationale the category stretch or crossover can be
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protected.14 In this sense, the methods and strategies that enable an understanding of the
expression thus partake in the very being of the subject understood. The handling of lan-
guage then functions reflexively in that it is seen to correspond with and reflect transpar-
ently the subjects. In sum, the legal decision reverberates around the mechanism that
‘distributes speakers among the different types of discourse’ and ‘appropriates those
types of discourse to certain categories of subject’ (Foucault, 1972: 227).15 Then, it is
not that there is an interpretation imposed on the ‘signs’: each event is already an inter-
pretation impacting the signature and the signatory (cf. Foucault, 1990: 64–66). What is
remarkable here is the way the framework of the right to freedom of expression draws on
multiple logics, rationalities, and investments of power to function as such. By doing
this, it not only discloses expressivity as a general object and brings it onto a governmen-
tal plane but also governmentalizes the being of the sovereign guaranteeing the right of
freedom of expression. It is this question, of the sovereign, to which the next section
turns.
Summoning the Logics of the Significations: On the Sovereign
and the Signature
I must say words as long there are words, I must say them until they find me, until they say
me. (Samuel Beckett, Molloy)
Precisely because the subject may either rearticulate expression unpredictably or escape
particular schematic forms (Butler, 1997: 41; Gadamer, 2003: 401), expression is needed
from the subjects so that the way performativity relates to permissibility can be
accounted for. In this sense, when a certain expression is not protected (say, as a threat
to democracy) and its corresponding subject abandoned (say, as nonintegrative), the lim-
its of the legally tolerable are charted out through language. The very fact that the sover-
eign is to stand at distance, intervene at particular moments in order to optimize the
overall economy of speech, creates a certain moment of unease. Since language evades
any foreclosure (Gadamer, 2003: 401, 447), the power working through it remains vul-
nerable to falling short. Since the sovereign nevertheless has to analyze language in order
to protect it, the power guaranteeing free speech is further engaged because of this vul-
nerability.16 The way free speech functions in human rights therefore enables an atten-
tiveness toward the use of language by reading its significations (nonviolent, useful, and
disturbing), dividing it onto a grid (political, scientific, and commercial), generating data
and knowledge (indexes of freedom), and establishing the bifurcations of truths (provo-
cative/violent, controversial/hateful, and offensive/threatening). These tactics both
enable an expression to be made free and reflexively inform the sovereign of those
spaces where it has remained unable to conduct the government in the best way. At the
moment when the sovereign simply intervenes into the domain of expression in order to
limit it, regardless of the conditions established on the basis of such truths, it steps out of
the juridical fold of the protection of freedom of expression as per the human rights
discourse.
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The peculiar truths and conditions under which the sovereign is to guarantee the right
to freedom of expression explain the paradoxical but primordial relationship between
free speech and the sovereign, that is, free speech can aim at anything, including the
sovereign, but it is also to be protected by the sovereign. This means that the sovereign
is not the one who primarily ‘decides on the state of exception’(Schmitt, 2005: 1), but the
one interlocked in between the legal norms of human rights on the one hand and the gov-
ernmental practices optimizing the lives of the population on the other (Rose, 1996: 43–
44). Consequently, the politically important question is that which specific guarantor is
able to target expressivity as an object of government, through what kind of mechanisms,
under what truth conditions, and generating which forms of power. It is crucial because
the guarantor who is able to perform such a task appropriates sovereignty onto itself in
the process.
Apart from the investments that constitute and sustain one’s free speech, expressivity
is targeted as an object of government in another sense as well. It is in the sense of deter-
mining the specific force that a signature generates and in what manner may this be
sieved through the instrument of human rights. The question then is the regulation of this
force in the apt manner. Here, two dimensions of this aspect can be selectively looked at.
First is the connection of expressivity to violence. Now, it is true that in human rights it is
difficult to legally allow for calls that effectively incite the others to pure violence within
a specific nation-state, such as those calls that present violence as both ‘necessary and
justified’ (Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3), para. 40). Further, the same rationale makes it diffi-
cult to allow groups to exercise their right to freedom of expression and association who
may have connections with internally operative organizations that ‘advocate the use of
violence’ as a part of their political program, as the Venice Commission guidelines state
(VC, 1999: 4). For example, this point can discern in Herri Batasuna v. Spain and Etxe-
berria v. Spain where ECtHR upheld the decisions of the Spanish authorities to cancel
the candidacy of certain electoral groups in Basque country in the light of their possible
links with the banned Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Contrastively, however, calls for
explicit violence in another nation-state, directed toward those others that are members
of a different political organization, are protected by human rights.17 In this sense,
demanding tougher economic and political sanctions against another nation-state or pro-
testing peacefully and lobbying in favor of participation in a foreign war (that may
respectively threaten the livelihood and the very being of humans out there) is allowable
when it comes to the jurisprudence of the right to freedom of expression. In order to
explore the interconnection of violence and free speech, Sürek is also a useful case in
point. In this case, it is not the overall milieu of violence, along with its objectives, neces-
sities, and rationale, which also needs to be tested through with respect to the standards
of human rights, but only the specific acts taking place within such a bracketed situation
(cf. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, para. 149). It means that the present is bracketed not
in the sense that one does not determine through the discourse of rights the entire histor-
ical situation of nation-building and republicanism in Turkey, but in the sense that even
within the then violent situation of counterinsurgency only specific acts of violence, lin-
guistic or otherwise, turn up as a legal question.
The said dynamic however is not in contradistinction to free speech because the free-
dom of subject stands in between the circumscription of subjectivities and the
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circumspection of language. The legally protected domain of free speech therefore does
not eliminate violence, broadly construed, but is itself related through complex transac-
tions to violence. One needs to study here how free speech enables the sovereign to order
violence: that is, by helping it frame violence (in Sürek: the violence of the speech in
question), explore its modalities, intensities, and effectiveness (in Sürek: the relation it
forms with the violence that is existing in the southeastern Turkey, whether this violence
remains within or exceeds the threshold of the tolerable, what is its social impact and
political efficacy), and then enabling the sovereign to deal befittingly with the violence
disclosed as ‘illegitimate’ (in Sürek: not giving too much space to the rebels expressing
the dismemberment of the Turkish Republic, suppressing that speech that redirects vio-
lence onto the representatives of state). What is essential to note is the fact that the sover-
eign guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression is, precisely because of this process,
enabled to channelize violence by shielding off those claims to sovereignty from vio-
lence that it upholds, while deflecting violence toward those that it does not (cf. Asad,
2007: 26). Resultantly, this process ensures that violence is not assured a reality outside
law and is arrested in a juridical context (cf. Benjamin, 1996: 239).
Second is the connection of expressivity to the other and the self. Now, the force with
which an expression can rightly impact the other and the signatory itself in turn varies.
From the perspective of law, it is differently permissible when it is directed toward some-
one belonging to a legally recognized ethnic minority than someone belonging to a crim-
inal network evading law, for instance. In both the cases, expression can be seen as an
extension of the self of the addressee. However, the way one’s self-expression is then
posed as libel, hate speech, intimidation, personal insult, or the violation of rights and
reputations of others depends on the life that that signatory bears, the life toward which
that signature is directed, and the way the signature takes place. In Sürek, for example,
expressions were contained as violating the respect for the rights and reputations of oth-
ers when directed against the civil servants or as being hate speech when directed toward
the ethnic Turks. However, from the other side, the legal safeguard against such misuses
was not available for the Kurdish rebels, who in their capacity as political partisans mini-
mize the full set of enjoyable human rights. This also means that the flow of subjectiv-
ities in which ‘lives’ are situated already bear a certain meaning for their agency and for
their subjection. This ontological disclosure of a specific life goes on to shape the
politico-ethical question that determines the threshold of violence to which a life in its
peculiarity can be exposed, that is, by the sovereign, by the others, and by itself. In cases
where the force of a signature is excessive, the relevant question becomes to see the man-
ner in which it is signed, its directionality toward the social issues, the way it impacts the
addressed, and the impact it has on the addressee and on the social body at large.
This means that there are two correlations. First is between the predicate and the sub-
ject on one hand and between the significations of an expression and their social oper-
ability on the other. Second is between the signatory and the flows of subjectivity on the
one hand and between the significations of an expression and their legal regulation on the
other. There are thus complex transactions that already relate one’s expressive capacity
to the juridical field. For, if the subject of freedom of expression ‘acts in and through’
language (Butler, 1997: 11), and if one’s expressions are to be impacted by the notions
like ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘prevention of disorder’ or ‘national security’ or ‘public
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safety’ in order to become protectable (as Article 10(2) states), then this does not simply
entail either that these notions remain in the abstract or that expression has to make room
for them, but that these are what every subject bears (has to bear?) via language in its
very being. This mechanism also goes on to inform other rights that refer to the right
of freedom of expression: freedom of thought and conscience, assembly and association,
protest and free self-development. The net effect, then, of all this is to identify a certain
shape that the free self-expression of the subjects has to have (cf. Asad, 2009: 27–28;
Butler, 1997: 97–98). If the right to freedom of expression is thus entangled with a sover-
eign for its protection as per Article 10(1) and its exceptions as per Article 10(2), then
this entails not only that the sovereign guarantees the human rights associated with it
or that as a potentiality the entire expressive domain comes under the juridical frame,
but also that this right reinforces the ‘realness’ of the sovereign that is guaranteeing it
as a right (cf. Foucault, 2007: 118, 239; Veyne, 1997).
In Lieu of ‘a Last Word’
If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct which multitudes of
individuals could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain con-
duct when occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist. (Herbert L. A.
Hart, The Concept of Law)
Language permeates law. Even when through law language is analyzed by identifying
what qualifies as a protected speech and what not, it is law as well which is accessed
through and determined by language. At the moment then that bodies are named and
called, inscribed and read, a complex power mechanism works on the subjects. The
thread of power lying at the interconnection of law and language becomes clear when
one notices that only the nameable is temporal and can be subjected to the tactics of tem-
porality.18 This peculiar nexus then governs the subject thus constituted. Subsequently,
the manner in which those subjects express themselves brings to the fore the manner as
per which the dynamics of power unfold. It is this peculiar movement of subjectivity that
has been read in this article by focusing on free speech. Consequently, it is in the way it
relates to the speech – if expression is to be seen as a certain ‘possession’ – that both the
possessor (the subject) and the possessed (its logos: world, reason, and word) become
free.
Further, this article has argued that the question of free speech is tied to the issue of a
government of expressivity. It is because of this dynamic that the right to freedom of
expression is already connected to the flow of subjectivities, techniques of ordering vio-
lence, rationalities of establishing the gradations among the speakers, the historicity of
social practices, the technologies of and the policies relating to communication, and the
legal rules and regulatory standards. Alternately, expressivity cannot be governed if it is
not tied to a peculiar production of freedom through free speech. In this sense, despite a
peculiar structural formation that constitutes free speech in human rights, the fold of dif-
ference remains fundamentally open and contingent, enabling inclusion of diverse
expressions and subjectivities under the banner of free speech. Resultantly, governing
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expressivity both concerns itself with the question as to how the government is to be con-
ducted and as to how the conduct is to be governed (Dean, 1999: 27; Foucault, 1983:
220–221; Foucault, 2007: 503). In this sense, free speech not only requires that there
be a specific kind of polity and subjects in order to function as such, but more fundamen-
tally realizes both at the same time that it realizes itself. From this perspective, then, free-
dom is the reference point, the instrument, and the effect of governmental praxis
(Foucault, 2008: 62–64). This means that the techniques of government are consequently
generated by the force working on free speech and the force produced by free speech.
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Notes
1. Given that this article focuses on a specific case law set and anchors its discussion largely into
it, the reference to the broader case law remains restrictive. This however is not to deny the
existence of other leading European cases on free speech that can be taken up with effect in
order to trace the different lines of force through which the right to freedom of expressions
works, such as: Goodwin v the United Kingdom [1996], Application No. 17488/90, Judgment
27 March 1996, European Court of Human Rights; Sunday Times v the United Kingdom [1979],
Application No. 6538/74, Judgment 26 April 1979, European Court of Human Rights; Wille v
Liechtenstein [1999], Application No. 28396/95, Judgment 28 October 1999, European Court
of Human Rights; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland [1992], Application No.
14234/88 and 14235/88, Judgment 29 Oct 1992, European Court of Human Rights; Informa-
tionsverein Lentia and Others v Austria [1993], Application No. 13914/88, 15041/89,
15717/89, 15779/89, and 17207/90, Judgment 24 Nov 1993, European Court of Human Rights;
Jersild v Denmark [1994], Application No. 15890/89, Judgment 23 Sep 1993, European Court
of Human Rights; Oberschlick (No. 2) v Austria [1997], Application No. 20834/92, Judgment 1
July 1997, European Court of Human Rights; Hadjianastassiou v Greece [1992], Application
No. 12945/87, Judgment 16 Dec 1992, European Court of Human Rights; Lehideux and Isorni
v France [1998], Application No. 24662/94, Judgment 23 Sep 1998, European Court of Human
Rights; Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom [2013], Application No. 48876/08,
Judgment 22 April 2013, European Court of Human Rights; and, Zana v Turkey [1997], Appli-
cation No. 18954/91, Judgment 25 Nov 1997, European Court of Human Rights.
2. In Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey, the joint concurring opinion of judges Palm, Tulkens, and oth-
ers, argued that more weight should be accorded in European Court of Human Rights judg-
ments to the milieu in which the expression takes place, which may include considerations as:
Did the author of the offending text occupy a position of influence in society of a sort likely to
amplify the impact of his words? Was the publication given a degree of prominence either in an
important newspaper or through another medium which was likely to enhance the influence of the
impugned speech? Were the words far away from the center of violence or on its doorstep?
3. In Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, European Court of Human Rights emphasized that ‘Article 10 of the
Convention [did] not guarantee unrestricted freedom of expression, even in press reports on
serious questions of general interest’ (para. 45).
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4. Both these characters are from Kurdish folklore. As narrated by Kurdish nationalists, Noruz
marks the overthrow of the oppressive Assyrian King Dehak by a popular uprising led by the
legendary hero Kawa.
5. By using the concept of signature, inspired from Derrida’s reading of Austin (Derrida, 1988:
19–20), three things are emphasized. First, language precedes the subject who utilizes it and
partakes in it. Second, in the jurisprudence of free speech, when an expression is problema-
tized, it may in certain cases take place within a chain of language users and rely on specific
historicity. In Sürek No. 4, for instance, this includes the journalist who interviews Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistan member, the reporter who composes the interview, the content editor who
edits, the major shareholder of the review, and so on. By virtue of being appended to this
chain, by simply having one’s signature inserted into it, one’s expressivity and one’s status
as a subject is problematized. This means that there can be various signatories within a specific
signature. Third, as a concept, the accent of signature is not on presupposed immediateness,
either that of the addressee or that of the addressed. This is helpful when one sees that the right
of freedom of expression allows that the visually expressed and the spoken/written word to be
preemptively analyzed, as in certain cases where it is determined what impact the readable or
the visual will have on the social body even before it reaches its targeted recipients. Further,
the concept is also useful in appreciating the way that what is expressed bears the imprint of a
specific technological assemblage that mediates it.
6. Since the specific juridical subject of the right to freedom of expression is placed into the
flows of subjectivity and orders of knowledge, performativity is not performance (Butler,
1993: 223–241).
7. See, more generally, Macovei (2004) for a concise discussion on the duties and responsibil-
ities of the right holders of Article 10.
8. The approximation can never completely be an appropriation. This is noted by Austin himself
as he notes that ‘it is inherent in the nature of any procedure that the limits of its applicability,
and therewith, of course, the ‘‘precise’’ definition of the procedure, will remain vague’ (Aus-
tin, 1962: 31). This however is precisely the strength of free speech as governmentality, a
point we come across in the next section.
9. If the signatory and its acts are performative, then this also entails that the subject is not prior
to the performative and that it itself is a process. This means that the effectiveness of free
speech remains precisely in opening up a field of difference that the sovereign may order but
not in itself completely determine.
10. One cannot therefore equate the process of the constitution of subjects, including their jur-
idical being as subjects of rights, with the acts of justification on behalf of those subjects (e.
g. Forst, 2011). Hence, the paradox: either justification precedes subject formation and is
ineffective or it follows the latter and is redundant. Therefore, one has tautology: the sub-
jects of human rights can be justified human rights once they have already been constituted
as the subjects of human rights. This however leads to a more troublesome conclusion: for
those who can neither justify themselves through nor accept from the others the justifica-
tions that utilize the moral vocabulary of human rights may not enjoy the full set associated
with it.
11. Given this exquisite intersection of law and language, it can be appreciated why it becomes
difficult to legally protect a speech that explicitly counsels the overturning of the rule of law,
effectively beseeches the violation of law or obstructs the course of justice, or subjects the
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courts of law to a constant contempt (e.g. Zihlmann v. Switzerland and Jääskeläinen v. Fin-
land). In a similar vein, those expressions may never turn up as protectable under European
Convention on Human Rights Article 10 whose very rationale is to go against the ‘text and
spirit of the Convention’ (Witzsch v. Germany, para. 3).
12. In X and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, the European Commission of Human Rights stated that:
the level of protection [accorded to ‘commercial’ speech] must be less than that accorded to the
expression of ‘political’ ideas, in the broadest sense, with which the values underpinning the con-
cept of freedom of expression in the Convention [were] chiefly concerned. (p. 73)
In a discussion on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it has been noted:
The indications are that commercial expression is not regarded as so worthy of protection as polit-
ical or even artistic expression and that some considerations which make expression value in the
political context may not apply in quite the same way in the commercial environment. (Harris
et al., 1995: 402)
The same writers therefore consider it possible to discern ‘different categories of expression’
(Harris et al., 1995: 396).
13. In Handyside, European Court of Human Rights observed that:
whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes ‘‘duties and responsibilities’’ the scope of
which depends on his situation and the technical means he uses. The Court cannot overlook such a
person’s ‘‘duties’’ and ‘‘responsibilities’’ when it enquires, as in this case, whether ‘‘restrictions’’ or
‘‘penalties’’ were conducive to the ‘‘protection of morals’’ which made them ‘‘necessary’’ in a
‘‘democratic society.’’ (para. 49)
14. Hart notices that even when one discerns legal categorizations as ‘open textured’ (Hart, 1994:
126, 128), it should not detract one from their practical usefulness and effective social role
(Hart, 1994: 126–130).
15. In this regard, Rose notes:
If language is organized in regimes of signification through which it is distributed across spaces,
times, zones, and strata, and assembled together in practical regimes of things, bodies, and forces,
then the ‘‘discursive construction of the self’’ appears rather differently who speaks, according to
what criteria of truth, from what places, in what relations, acting in what ways, supported by what
habits, routines, authorized in what ways, in what spaces and places, and under what forms of per-
suasion, sanction, lies, and cruelties? (Rose, 1998a: 178)
16. Because of this, law turns out to be both necessary and possible, but neither perfect nor
exhaustive, as Cover notes (Cover, 1986: 1613).
17. Even if one may argue that human rights itself does not produce a human-other, it is correct to
discern that human rights remain constitutionally unable to do away with the anthropological
notion of ‘the other’. It means that when a polity projects the other based on politics or terri-
toriality, human rights only work to regulate the relation between this citizen-human within
and the noncitizen-human without.
18. The primordial connection of life, language, and power is succinctly captured by Lacan in his
observation that ‘the name is the time of the object’ (Lacan, 1988: 169). In a similar vein, Rose
notes that ‘language not only makes acts of government describable; it also makes them pos-
sible’ (Rose, 1999: 28).
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Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) [1999], Application No. 24735/94, Judgment July 8, 1999, European Court
of Human Rights.
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